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or  internally activating their perceptual consequences (e.g., 
Greenwald, 1970; Prinz, 1997; Elsner and Hommel, 2001; Herwig 
et al., 2007; Kühn et al., 2010).
A number of studies have corroborated the ideomotor account 
of action control. For instance, Elsner and Hommel (2001) used 
a paradigm similar to the one reported below. They investigated 
the incidental learning of arbitrary action–effect associations by 
making their participants first undergo an acquisition phase, in 
which two key presses always produced two particular tones. In 
the subsequent test phase, the same tones were presented as target 
stimuli for a speeded-choice response. Elsner and Hommel report 
that the choice responses were faster in response to the tone that 
the action had previously produced than to the tone that had been 
produced by the alternative action. This demonstrates that, during 
the acquisition phase, participants acquire bidirectional associa-
tions between the motor code of the action and the perceptual 
code of the auditory effect. Neuroimaging studies, although scarce, 
confirm the conclusions drawn from the behavioral experiments. 
Elsner et al. (2002) showed that the mere perception of auditory 
stimuli that previously had been presented as effect tones of cer-
tain actions result in the activation of neural motor structures 
IntroductIon
The ability to produce desired effects in the environment constitutes 
an essential aspect of human behavior (cf., Haggard, 2008). The 
concept of voluntary action is omnipresent in our interaction with 
the environment and our social lives. It has not only a wide impact 
on philosophical (free will), but also on ethical issues (account-
ability). Moreover, disorders of voluntary action are characteristic 
of many psychiatric and neurological conditions (Jahanshahi and 
Frith, 1998).
Yet, it is only rather recently that research has begun to 
investigate voluntary action experimentally. One focus of this 
research has been the fact that to purposefully achieve an action 
goal presupposes knowledge about action–effect relationships. 
Without this knowledge any action effect would be acciden-
tal and goal-directed action impossible. The ideomotor theory 
accentuates the role of the anticipation of sensory effects in 
action control (cf., Lotze, 1852; Harless, 1861; James, 1890). 
In particular, it claims that performing an action results in a 
bidirectional association between the action’s motor code and 
the sensory effects the action produces. Once acquired, these 
associations can be used to select an action by anticipating 
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until a response was given and were presented with a jittered inter-
trial interval of 2000–4000 ms (varied in steps of 500 ms). After 
100 trials participants were instructed via the intercom that their 
responses would now be followed by pictures to which they do not 
have to pay special attention. During this acquisition phase right 
and left hand responses were consistently followed by a certain 
stimulus category (e.g. right → face, left → house). The mapping 
was balanced between subjects. We used five different black and 
white pictures of faces and of houses (Heekeren et al., 2004) that 
were presented for 200 ms in the square 50 ms after a button press 
occurred. After two runs consisting of 400 acquisition trials par-
ticipants were exposed to the test phase which was identical to the 
baseline phase. In total the experiment consisted of four runs and 
lasted approximately 45 min.
After completion of the experiment subjects were asked whether 
they noticed an association between the button press and the pic-
tures presented. If participants did notice, they were asked to specify 
the association. If they did not notice, they were specifically asked 
whether they noticed that a certain button press always elicited the 
same category of pictures.
Notice that our paradigm did not include a reaction time test 
phase assessing the degree to which participants have learned the 
action–effects [as in the study from Elsner and Hommel (2001)]. 
For two reasons. First, behavioral effects of action effect associations 
have been replicated in a number of experiments (e.g., Elsner and 
Hommel, 2004; Herwig et al., 2007; Herwig and Waszak, 2009). 
Second, after the fMRI test phase, the focus of the present study, 
the action–effect associations may have decayed anyway.
ScannIng Procedure
Images were collected with a 3T Magnetom Trio MRI scanner 
system (Siemens Medical Systems, Erlangen, Germany) using an 
8-channel radiofrequency head coil. First, high-resolution ana-
tomical images were acquired using a T1-weighted 3D MPRAGE 
sequence (TR = 1550 ms, TE = 2.39 ms, TI = 900 ms, acquisition 
matrix = 256 × 256 × 176, sagittal FOV = 220 mm, flip angle = 9º, 
voxel size = 0.9 × 0.9 × 0.9 mm3). Whole brain functional images 
were collected using a T2*-weighted EPI sequence sensitive to 
BOLD contrast (TR = 2000 ms, TE = 35 ms, image matrix = 64 × 64, 
FOV = 224 mm, flip angle = 80º, slice thickness = 3.0 mm, distance 
factor = 17%, voxel size 3.5 × 3.5 × 3 mm3, 30 axial slices). 390 image 
volumes aligned to AC-PC were acquired per run.
fMrI data Pre-ProceSSIng and gLM anaLySIS
The fMRI data were analyzed with statistical parametric mapping 
using the SPM5 software (Wellcome Department of Cognitive 
Neurology, London, UK). The first four volumes of all EPI series 
were excluded from the analysis to allow the magnetization to 
approach a dynamic equilibrium. Data processing started with 
slice time correction and realignment of the EPI datasets. A mean 
image for all EPI volumes was created, to which individual vol-
umes were spatially realigned by rigid body transformations. The 
high-resolution structural image was co-registered with the mean 
image of the EPI series. Then the structural image was normalized 
to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template, and the 
normalization parameters were applied to the EPI images to ensure 
an anatomically informed normalization. During normalization 
(see also Mutschler et al., 2007; Melcher et al., 2008). Thus, the 
perception of action effects directly activates associated motor 
codes. The aim of the experiment presented below is to investigate 
the reverse link, viz. whether acting activates the corresponding 
perceptual representation.
Related to the ideomotor approach of action control, and extend-
ing it, is the common coding theory. The common coding theory 
goes to such lengths as to claim that perception and action share a 
common representational code (e.g., Prinz, 1990, Hommel et al., 
2001): Actions are coded in terms of the distal perceptual effects 
they evoke in the environment. As a consequence, perceiving an 
action effect involves the same representation as performing the 
associated action and, conversely, performing an action involves the 
same representation as perceiving the associated effect.
The common coding principle has been corroborated by a 
number of studies (see Hommel et al., 2001, 2003; Schütz-Bosbach 
and Prinz, 2007; Hoffmann et al., 2009). For example, Kunde 
(2001, 2003) showed that compatibility between responses and 
their consistent sensorial effects influences performance in choice 
reaction tasks as if the forthcoming effects were already sensorially 
present. However, none of these studies showed neurophysiological 
evidence for their most straightforward prediction, viz. that per-
forming an action involves the activation of the sensory effect it 
usually triggers.
The present study does so by harnessing the modularity of per-
ceptual category representation in the human brain. In particular, 
it has been shown that faces and houses are represented in the fusi-
form face area (FFA) and in the parahippocampal place area (PPA), 
respectively (Kanwisher et al., 1997; Epstein and Kanwisher, 1998). 
We made subjects acquire an association between left and right key 
presses and face and house stimuli as action effects. Since activity 
in the PPA and the FFA can be easily dissociated when measuring 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI); see Heekeren et al. 
(2004), we were able to test subsequently whether performing an 
action in the absence of face and house effect stimuli yields activity 
in cortical areas involved in the perceptual representation of the 
sensory effects which the actions used to trigger.
MaterIaLS and MethodS
PartIcIPantS
We recruited nineteen healthy participants (three males; age: 
mean = 21.0, ranging from 19 to 24) from whom we obtained writ-
ten consent prior to the scanning session. All subjects had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. No subject had a history of neurologi-
cal, major medical, or psychiatric disorder. All participants were 
right-handed as assessed by a handedness questionnaire (Oldfield, 
1971). We had to exclude two participants, one because of severe 
movement artifacts the other because of technical failure.
BehavIoraL taSk
During the first part of the fMRI experiment, the baseline phase, 
participants had to respond as fast as possible either with the index 
finger of their right or left hand when a white square was presented 
on the screen while lying in the scanner (Figure 1). Participants 
were asked to select their responses voluntarily but aim at an equal 
distribution of right and left button presses without having a spe-
cial rule of responding. The white squares remained on the screen 
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(with a radius of 6 mm around the peak coordinate) on the con-
trasts of the face and house presentation during the acquisition 
phase individually for each participant thresholded with a level 
of significance of p < 0.001. Two regions of interest (ROIs) were 
defined in bilateral FFA resulting from the whole-brain contrast 
of face > house in the acquisition phase. Moreover we defined two 
ROIs in bilateral PPA resulting from the whole-brain contrast of 
house > face in the acquisition phase. The mean MNI-coordinates 
were −24 −54 −17 (meanSD = 6.4) for the left PPA, 27 −48 −17 (5.3) 
for the right PPA, −40 −60 −21 (4.6) for the left FFA and 43 −57 −21 
(4.9) for the right FFA (similar to e.g., Haxby et al., 1999). Then 
we used these ROIs to assess the difference between brain activity 
during the baseline phase and the test phase. For each subject, 
region and condition separately the mean percent signal change 
over a time window of 4–6 s after stimulus onset was calculated 
and analyzed by means of a ROI (FFA vs. PPA) × hemisphere (left 
vs. right) × experimental phase (baseline vs. test) × predicted effect 
(face vs. house) repeated measure ANOVA. Significant effects are 
reported with a threshold of p < 0.05.
reSuLtS
In order to exclude, that participants used simple alternation 
strategies to achieve an equal distribution we calculated the 
mean random number generation (RNG) measure (Evans, 
1978). This measure considers the randomness of the sequence, 
the anatomy image volumes were re-gridded to 1 × 1 × 1 mm3. A 
commonly applied spatial filter of 8 mm full-width at half maxi-
mum (FWHM) was used. Low-frequency drifts in the time domain 
were removed by modeling the time series for each voxel by a set of 
discrete cosine functions to which a cut-off of 128 s was applied. 
The subject-level statistical analyses were performed using the gen-
eral linear model (GLM). We modeled the onset of the squares 
during the baseline phase and the test phase separately for right 
and left hand responses. Moreover the model contained regressors 
of the onset of the face and the house picture in the acquisition 
phase. Vectors containing the event onsets were convolved with 
the canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF) to form the 
main regressors in the design matrix (the regression model). The 
vectors were also convolved with the temporal derivatives and 
the resulting vectors were entered into the model. The statistical 
parameter estimates were computed separately for each voxel for 
all columns in the design matrix. Contrast images were constructed 
from each individual to compare the relevant parameter estimates 
for the regressors containing the canonical HRF.
Percent SIgnaL change anaLySIS
To explore the neural correlates of the reactivation of a pictorial 
stimulus resulting from an acquired action–effect binding we 
focused on percent signal changes in brain areas related to face 
and house processing, namely FFA and PPA. We defined the ROIs 
Figure 1 | Schematic drawing of the experimental setup.
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To test whether participants showed this selective PPA and FFA 
activity during the test phase, even if they were not aware of the 
action–effect manipulation during the acquisition phase, we ran 
a separate ANOVA (ROI × experimental phase × predicted effect) 
including only those five subjects which, during the debriefing after 
the experiment, reported not to have noticed the mapping between 
the two keys and the two classes of effect stimuli. The triple interac-
tion of this ANOVA was significant: F(1,4) = 14.77, p = 0.018. Post 
hoc paired t-tests revealed a significantly higher activation in house 
compared to face associated response during the test phase in PPA 
(t(4) = −5.60, p < 0.01) but no significantly higher activation in 
face compared to house associated response during the test phase 
in FFA (t(16) = 0.844, p = 0.45). We will come back to this result 
in the discussion.
Furthermore we computed whole-brain analyses comparing the 
test phase with the baseline phase, separately for responses associ-
ated with faces and responses associated with houses. The con-
junction of those contrasts (thresholded at p < 0.001, cluster > 22, 
based on Monte Carlo simulation determined minimum cluster 
namely the dependency between one choice and the next. Our 
results yielded to an average RNG of 0.827. Comparing this 
to randomly produced sequences of two equally distributed 
response options no significant difference was detected in the 
RNG measure (0.826, t(16) = 0.47, p = 0.65).
When computing a repeated measures ANOVA with the fac-
tors ROI, hemisphere, experimental phase and predicted effect the 
threefold interaction of ROI, experimental phase and predicted 
effect was significant (F(1,16) = 10.62, p = .005; Figure 2). Post hoc 
paired t-tests revealed a significant difference between the face and 
house associated response in PPA (t(16) = −4.28, p < 0.01) and a 
marginally significant difference in FFA (t(16) = 2.06, p = 0.056) 
during the test phase, but no significant differences during the 
baseline phase (PPA: t(16) = 0.81, p = 0.43; FFA: t(16) = −0.37, 
p = 0.72). This indicates – in line with our prediction – that partici-
pants reactivate the consequence of their actions as they learned it 
during the acquisition phase. Furthermore the interaction of ROI 
and predicted effect (F(1,16) = 5.38, p < 0.05) and the main effect 
of ROI (F(1,16) = 9.49, p < 0.01) were significant.
Figure 2 | Percent signal changes between baseline and test phase 
of rOis in (A) bilateral fusiform face area (FFA; sphere with radius 
6 mm around individual peak voxel of the contrast face > house of 
the acquisition phase) and (B) bilateral parahippocampal place area 
(PPA; sphere with radius 6 mm around individual peak voxel of 
the contrast house > face of the acquisition phase). Error bars  
depict within subjects standard error of the mean (see Loftus and  
Masson, 1994).
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oddball task (i.e., most of the time a standard tone and, rarely, a 
perceptually deviant tone was presented). Deviant and standard 
stimuli were the same tones used as effect tones in the first phase 
of the experiment. Deviant stimuli elicited a larger P3a when the 
action that triggered stimulus presentation was associated with the 
standard tone than when it was associated with the deviant tone, 
indicating a larger orienting response in the former case. Thus, 
the experiment of Waszak and Herwig shows, in accordance with 
the present study, that performing a voluntary action involves the 
anticipation of sensory events the movement usually brings about 
in the environment.
The results of the present study extend our present knowledge 
on ideomotor action in that they demonstrate that the activation of 
sensory effect representations actually draws on processes that are 
tightly associated to the genuine perception of these sensory events. 
That PPA and FFA are associated with the perceptual representation 
of houses and faces has been shown by Tong et al. (1998). These 
authors assessed the BOLD response in PPA and FFA to monitor 
stimulus-selective responses during binocular rivalry. When pre-
sented with a face and a house stimulus to different eyes, subjects 
experience spontaneous alternations every few seconds between 
a face percept and a house percept. Tong et al. showed that these 
perceptual alternations are accompanied by time-locked BOLD 
responses in the FFA and PPA that correlate with the content of 
visual awareness, suggesting that activity in the FFA and PPA reflects 
the perceived stimulus.
However, selective activation within the FFA and the PPA has 
not only been demonstrated during the perception of faces and 
houses, respectively, but also when the internal representations of 
face and house stimuli have to be maintained over time or re-
evoked in the absence of any external stimulation. O’Craven and 
Kanwisher (2000) found top–down effects in FFA and PPA during 
mental imagery of faces and scenes. Likewise, Johnson et al. (2007) 
made subjects think briefly of a just-seen, but no longer present, 
face/scene stimulus. This act of “refreshing” of faces and scenes 
modulated, amongst others, activity in respectively the FFA and 
PPA. Finally, a number of studies have demonstrated that these 
areas also exhibit delay-period activity during working memory 
maintenance of the appropriate category of stimuli (e.g., Druzgal 
and D’Esposito, 2003; Ranganath et al., 2004). All these observa-
tions are in line with the view that reflective thought using internal 
representations of stimuli entails top–down modulation of activity 
in perceptual cortical regions initially activated during the percep-
tion of these stimuli.
The present study complements these findings in that they show 
that the tight coupling between visual perception of external stimuli 
and internal representation of stimuli in the absence of sensory 
input has to be extended to include internal anticipation of sensory 
action effects. It is important to note that even those participants 
who were not aware of the action–effect relationship during the 
acquisition phase showed selective activity in PPA and FFA during 
the test phase. This finding indicates that our participants did not 
actively generate internal representations of houses and faces while 
pressing the keys, because this would presuppose knowledge about 
the association between the two keys and the two effect classes. 
However, we would like to point out that the debriefing proce-
dure we used did not include a response-bias free measure of the 
size above which the probability of type I error was below 0.05, 
Alphasim, Ward, 2000) revealed significant activation in bilateral 
superior parietal cortex (BA 7) for the contrast test phase > baseline 
phase. This whole-brain analysis is confounded by the fact that 
the test phase was always presented later in the experiment than 
the baseline phase and should therefore be treated cautiously. The 
ROI analysis on the other hand is based on interactions between 
conditions and therefore circumvents this problem.
dIScuSSIon
To investigate whether voluntary actions involve the activation of 
perceptual representations of learned action effects, we assessed 
brain activity in FFA and PPA during self-selected actions that 
previously triggered face or house stimuli.
During the baseline phase activity in FFA and PPA was not differ-
ent between the two actions we investigated. However, activity in the 
test phase was elevated in the FFA for actions that in the acquisition 
phase triggered presentation of face stimuli (compared to actions 
that previously triggered house stimuli). By contrast, the opposite 
was true for the PPA: here activity was higher for actions that previ-
ously triggered presentation of house stimuli than for actions that 
previously triggered face stimuli. Notice that we observed these 
differences in activity in the absence of any action effect. It is thus 
the action itself that induces activation in FFA and PPA.
These results present straightforward evidence for the ideomotor 
principle of action control and the common coding principle which 
claim that motor plans represent the sensory events that the action 
habitually evokes in the environment (Prinz, 1990; Hommel et al., 
2001; Kühn et al., 2010). Participants learn that a specific action 
(left/right key press) results in a certain effect in the surroundings 
(faces/houses). Once this knowledge is acquired the activation of 
the perceptual representation of these effects becomes an integral 
part of the preparation and execution of the actions. The whole-
brain contrast revealed stronger superior parietal activation after 
the association between a specific action and its action–effect has 
been established. In the literature on the “binding problem” parietal 
cortex has been implicated in binding processes during visual fea-
ture perception (Shafritz et al., 2002) as well as in context of visual 
short-term memory (Xu, 2007). Our data suggests that superior 
parietal cortex may also be involved in binding of actions and their 
effects in the environment.
Recently, it has been suggested that the hemodynamic BOLD 
response measured in fMRI, not only implies a neural response, but 
can also reflect a preparatory mechanism that produces additional 
arterial blood in anticipation of an expected task or event (Sirotin 
and Das, 2009). While our current study cannot distinguish the 
contributions of these two components to the observed elevated 
sensory activation, the study of Waszak and Herwig (2007) dem-
onstrates a direct neural contribution. Using event-related poten-
tials (ERPs), Waszak and Herwig (2007) made subjects first work 
through an acquisition phase, in which a self-selected key press was 
always followed by a certain tone (e.g., left key press → high-pitch 
tone; right key press → low-pitch tone), establishing an association 
between the particular action and the perceptual code of the effect 
tone. In the test phase of the experiment subjects were required to 
perform random series of left and right key presses. The action 
triggered randomly one of the experimental stimuli of a typical 
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the  system in that they provide the motor command which will 
result in a desired end state (e.g., a particular sensory state) given 
a particular current state (Wolpert et al., 1995). In terms of inverse 
computation our results might indicate that performing an action 
involves the activation of a desired end state before the selection 
and preparation of the movement. In our experiment this end state 
would include house/face representations, since houses and faces 
have been tightly linked to the two possible actions. The activation 
in FFA and PPA may be readout to determine a response. This 
interpretation would directly mirror the assumptions of the ideo-
motor theory: Selecting an action begins with selecting a desired 
effect in the environment.
However, our data do not allow for conclusions about the order 
of “perceptual” and “motor” activity. The activities in the FFA and 
PPA reported above might reflect ideomotor effect anticipation 
(taking place rather early in the chain of events resulting in a 
voluntary action) or they might reflect effect representations 
triggered by response execution. This question is of theoretical 
importance: If effect anticipation takes place during early stages, 
it has most probably an important role in action decisions. If it 
takes place during the execution stage, it may serve action out-
come evaluation only. More research is necessary to shed light 
on the complex neurophysiological and cognitive antecedents of 
voluntary action and to explore the cognitive processes underly-
ing ideomotor learning. Future research might focus on the time 
course of idemotor learning (similar to Van Opstal et al., 2008, 
2009; Gheysen et al., 2010).
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awareness of the action–effect coupling. Moreover, the effects in 
question were significant only in the PPA but not in the FFA. Thus, 
the conclusion that the effects we reported above are independent 
of awareness of the association is only suggestive and has to be 
taken with caution.
Instead, we suggest that imagery and internal effect anticipa-
tion rely on shared mechanisms, with “perceptual” representa-
tions in posterior brain regions being modulated by top–down 
mechanisms originating in anterior brain regions. In the case of 
sensory effect anticipation, this top–down modulation may take 
form of an “efference copy”, a concept that is intimately related to 
the common coding approach. In many computational models 
of action control a forward model predicts the future behavioral 
state of the system, and the sensory consequences of that behavior 
(Wolpert et al., 1995). To do so, the model uses efference copies of 
the motor commands (Von Holst and Mittelstaedt, 1950). There is a 
large number of studies investigating the notion of efference copies. 
For example, Haggard and Whitford (2004) showed that muscle 
twitches evoked by TMS over the primary motor cortex (M1) were 
perceived to be smaller when participants made intention-based 
actions than when they did not. This sensory suppression is con-
sidered to be a result of the correct prediction. They also showed 
that a conditioning TMS prepulse transiently disrupting the sup-
plementary motor area (SMA) before the test pulse producing the 
muscle twitch almost abolished the sensory suppression effect. They 
concluded that the frontal cortex, specifically the SMA, sends an 
efferent signal of anticipated sensory effects to other brain areas. 
Evidently, a core aspect of the ideomotor theory is that intention-
based action selection does not only involve the anticipation of 
proximal somatosensory consequences, but also of remote visual 
or auditory effects. One may argue that the results of the present 
study reflect one of the consequences of an efferent copy generated 
in frontal motor areas.
However, computational models of action control do not 
only implement forward models to predict future states given a 
particular motor command and a particular current state. They 
also incorporate inverse models that invert the computation of 
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